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JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COMPENSATION AGENCIES
OVER INJURIES OCCURRING ON NAVIGABLE WATERS*
UNTIL recently claims for disability or death on navigable waters of em-
ployees engaged in activities not easily recognizable as "maritime" were pre-
sented either to a state or to a federal compensation agency at a substantial
risk of disallowance. For a state agency may constitutionally exercise juris-
diction over such claims only in those instances when, according to the rule
of Southern Pacific Company v. J'nsen,1 application of the state compensation
act will neither interfere with the "uniformity of admiralty law" nor prejudice
that law in its characteristic features.2 And the federal agency's statutory
* Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249 (1942).
1. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917) (holding that a state act
could not apply to a stevedore injured on navigable waters). For a concise resum6 of
subsequent cases dealing with this question, see London Co. v. Industrial Comm., 279
U. S. 109 (1929). Since the enactment of the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. §§ 901 et seq. (1940), the application
of state law has been limited also by the overriding federal statute. But the Supreme
Court has interpreted the federal statute as incorporating the Jensen doctrine as its cri-
terion of applicability. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244 (1941).
2. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 218 (1917). The constitutional
basis for the requirement of uniformity, U. S. CoNsT. ART. III, § 2, extends the judicial
power of the United States "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." In The
Lottawana, 21 Wall. 558 (U. S. 1874), it had previously been held that because of this
provision a uniform system of admiralty law must be dominant in the federal courts.
By the Jensen decision such uniformity was required for the first time in state courts.
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jurisdiction is complementary; existing only "if recovery for the disability or
death may not validly be provided by State law." 3 Since state law has been
interpreted as non-prejudicial when applied to an activity "local" in charac-
ter or one having "no direct relation to navigation and commerce," and
since federal law, by virtue of this delimitation, has been interpreted as
always applicable to "maritime" occupations 5 because these bear a direct rela-
tion to navigation and commerce, the issue of jurisdiction 0 depends in eacl
which are authorized to handle subject matter within the scope of admiralty by the savings
clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 1 STAT. 76 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 371 (1940) ; see
Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U. S. 427 (1927). Prior to the Lottaiavnna and Jensen
decisions, both state and federal courts were accustomed to resort to state law to supple-
ment their own rules. See La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95, 138 (1903) ; The Hamilton, 207
U. S. 398 (1907) ; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638, 646 (1899) ; The
3. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 (1893); The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 214 (1836); Sher-
lock v. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99, 104 (1876) ; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 579-80 (U. S.
1874) ; Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 395-96 (U. S. 1874) ; Steamboat Co. v. Chase,
16 Wall. 522, 533-34 (U. S. 1872) - Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 242 (U. S. 1871):
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851) ; New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344, 390-92 (U. S. 1848). Maritime law may
still be supplemented by state death statutes. See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S.
233, 242 (1921). For extended discussion of the Jensen case, see Conlen, Adminralty's
Jurisdictional Problem (1942) 16 TEMP'. L. Q. 311, Ten Years of the Jensen Case (1923)
76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 926; Cunningham, Is Every Count, Court in the United States a
Court of Admiral y? (1919) 53 Am. L. REvX. 749; Dodd, The New Doctrine of the Sn-
premacy of Admiralty Over the Common Law (1921) 21 CoL. L. Rrx. 647; Palfrey,
The Connon Law Courts and the Law of the Sea (1923) 36 HAr\. L RE%. 777; Wright,
Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States (1925) 73 U. or PA. L. REv. 123.
3. Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. 44 ST'ArT. 1424 (1927), 33
U. S. C. §§ 901 et seq. (1940). See Crowell v. Bensrn, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) (sustaining
the Act as constitutional). The Act is restricted in its application to injuries occurring
on navigable waters, including drydocks. See as authority for the inclusion of drydocks
within the scope of "navigable waters," The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17 (1903):
The Anglo-Patagonian, 235 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916), cert. denied. 242 U. S. 635
(1916) ; O'Hara's Case, 248 Mass. 31, 142 N. E. 844 (1924). The act does not cover the
master or crew of a vessel. See note 7 infra.
4. See Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S. 222, 230 (1930) ; Employers' Liability
Assur. Corp. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233, 236 (1930); Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand,
278 U. S. 142, 144 (192) ; Sultan Railway & Timber Co. v. Dep't of Labor and Industries
of Wash., 277 U. S. 135, 137 (1928) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm.,
276 U. S. 467, 469 (1928) ; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters Co. v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59,
64 (1926); Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922).
5. See Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U. S. 647 (1935); Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233 (1930): Northern Coal & Doc Cu.
v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142 (1928) ; Peters v. Veasey, 251 U. S. 121 (1919) ; Clyde Steam-
ship Co. i% Walker, 244 U. S. 255 (1917); Crane v. Pacific Steamship Co., 2 Fed. 24
(D. C. Ore. 1921).
6. The term "jurisdiction" is used here to connote broadly the respective classifica-
tions of situations to which a state or federal court may apply its own law. The term
"jurisdiction" has also been used with reference to admiralty law to connote that classi-
fication of situations to which the substantive principles of admiralty are applicable. Thus
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case upon the allocation of the employee's occupation at the time of the acci-
dent to one or the other of these vague classifications. While longshoremen
have been easily assimilated to exclusive federal jurisdiction as "maritime"
workers,7 others, whose functions are less easily relatable to navigation and
"admiralty jurisdiction" attaches to all maritime contracts and to all torts occurring on
navigable waters. See Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191, 197 (1911); Leathers v. Bless-
ing, 105 U. S. 626, 630 (1881) ; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 459 (U. S. 1847) ; see
also HUGHES, ADMIRALTY LAW (1901) c. II. The opinions of some courts would seem
to indicate that the Jensen case established boundaries of "admiralty jurisdiction." But
by the commonly accepted interpretation, it merely established criteria for determining
when a state may apply its law to a situation which admiralty principles generally govern.
The added principle is clearly deducible that state law is always applicable where the
situation does not fall within "admiralty jurisdiction." From the holding in State Indus-
trial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U. S. 263 (1922), the inference that
state law is not inapplicable merely because it may be applied within "admiralty juris-
diction" would seem justifiable. There, a stevedore had suffered injuries on land in the
course of his maritime employment. The New York Court of Appeals had decided that
the state law was not applicable, since a remedy in workmen's compensation was con-
tractual and, when applied to a maritime contract, fell within "admiralty juris-
diction." The Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals without decid-
ing that the jurisdiction was not in admiralty, stating: "In Jensen's case rights and lia-
bilities were definitely fixed by maritime rules, whose uniformity was essential. With
these the local law came into conflict. Here no such antagonism exists. There is no per-
tinent federal statute; and application of the local law will not work material prejudice
to any characteristic feature of the general admiralty law." 1d. at 276. From the case
of Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922), criteria for determining more
precisely when a state law is applicable within the field of "admiralty jurisdiction" have
been drawn. Rhode was injured while at work as a carpenter upon a partially completed
vessel lying in navigable waters within the state of Oregon. The Supreme Court, while
deciding that there was jurisdiction in admiralty because the alleged tort occurred on
navigable waters, went on to say that: ". . . in the circumstances stated the exclusive
features of the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act would apply and abrogate the right
to recover damages in an admiralty court." Id. at 478. Thus state law is applicable once
admiralty jurisdiction has been established, if the employment contract is of merely local
concern and its performance has no direct effect on navigation or commerce. See Baizley
Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S. 222, 230 (1930); Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v.
Cook, 281 U. S. 233, 236 (1930) ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142,
144 (1928) ; Sultan Railway & Timber Co. v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash.,
277 U. S. 135, 137 (1928) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 276
U. S. 467, 469 (1928) ; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters' Co. v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59, 64
(1926) ; Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, supra.
7. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U. S. 647 (1935) ; Employers' Liability
Assur. Corp., Ltd. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233 (1930) ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v, Strand,
278 U. S. 142 (1928) ; Peters v. Veasy, 251 U. S. 121 (1919) ; Clyde Steamship Co. v.
Walker, 244 U. S. 255 (1917) ; Crane v. Pacific Steamship Co., 272 Fed. 204 (D. C. Ore.
1921). But cf. I'Hote v. Crowell, 54 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932), rev'd, 286 U. S.
528 (1932). See also U. S. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION Cotmmssion, TwENTY-SixrT1
ANNUAL REPORT (1943) 32. Although stevedores have been considered "seamen" within
the meaning of the Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1940), Interna-
tional Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50 (1926), they are not considered a
". .. member of a crew of any vessel" to whom the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
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commerce, have suffered not only from the necessity of a case by case deter-
mination, but also from a lack of any recognizable judicial consistency in appli-
cation of the classifications. Thus the activities of a diver who suffocated while
removing timber from an abandoned set of ways obstructing navigable waters
have been held only indirectly relatable to navigation and commerce.8 while
those of a railway employee injured when loading cars on a float lying in navi-
gable waters have been held to have such a direct relation to navigation and
commerce as to fall within the jurisdiction of the federal statute.0 Therefore,
neither the employer making contribution nor the marginal employee making
application has been able to predict with any certainty the agency ultimately
responsible for compensation.10
Workers' Act does not apply. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U. S. C. § 903 (1940). See
South Chicago Coal and Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251 (1940) ; Puget Sound Freight
Lines v. Marshall, 125 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) ; see also faryland Casualty
Co. v. Lawson, 94 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
8. Millers' Indemnity Undervriters' Co. v. Braud, 270 U. S.59 (1926). For other cases
holding state law applicable to injuries on navigable waters, Fee Sultan Railway & Timber
Co. v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 277 U. S. 135 (1928) (employee injured
while assembling and breaking up log booms); Rosengrant Y. Havard, 273 U. S. 664
(1927), aff'g per curiam Ex parte Rosengrant, 203 Ala. 202, 104 So. 469 (1925) (lumber
inspector injured while inspecting lumber on floating barge). 'While these cases were
decided prior to the enactment of the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Act,
the test employed is the same as that applied subsequent to its enactment. See also Alaska
Packers' Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 276 U. S. 467, 469 (1928); c. P. J.
Carlin Construction Co. v. Heaney, 299 U. S. 41 (1936), where the court, consider-
ing workmen's compensation a contractual remedy, held state law, applicable because the
circumstances of the case fell outside "admiralty jurisdiction." See note 6 supra.
9. Nogueira v. New York, N. H. and H. R. R., 281 U. S. 128 (1930). Other cases
have held state law inapplicable to injuries on navigable waters. Parker v. Motor Boat
Sales, 314 U. S. 244 (1941) (janitor engaged in testing outboard motors on a motor
boat); Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281' U. S. 222 (1930) (employee painting angle iron
as part of the job of repairing a ship's engine room) ; Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.,
v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233 (1930) (employee unloading cargo while in the hold of a
ship); Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 27S U. S. 142 (1928) (employee unloading
cargo while aboard ship); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dal, 266 U. S. 449 (1925)
(employee repairing completed vessel); Peters v. Veasey, 251 U. S. 121 (1919) (employee
unloading cargo while aboard vessel); Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255
(1917) (employee unloading cargo while aboard ship).
10. When the injury occurs on land a similar problem presents itself, though the'
federal, act does, by its own terms, not apply. 44 STAT. 1424 (197), 33 U. S. C. § 903
(1940). Theoretically, the difficulty is even greater. Since workmen's compensation is
said to be contractual, the injury would fall within "admiralty jurisdiction" ii the em-
ployment were maritime, and if the employment bore a direct relation to navigation and
commerce, state law would not be applicable. Because admiralty, however, affords only a
tort remedy for injuries and its jurisdiction in tort is limited to navigable waters, "admir-
alty jurisdiction" would not attach, since the injury occurred on land. A practical pzr-
spective indicates that in such a situation the matter is always of merely local concern.
See State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922); Morrison,
Workmen's Compensation and Maritime Law (1929) 38 Y=u L J. 472, 483-91. The
problem is further complicated when injury begins on the water and is consummated on
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The Supreme Court intended to obviate the hazards resulting from this un-
certainty by its ruling in Davis v. Department of Labor and Indiustries of
Washington." The workman here was examining steel beams removed from
an abandoned drawbridge when he fell from a barge moored alongside. 12 Both
the state agency and the Washington Supreme Court bad rejected his widow's
claim for compensation on the ground that the state could not exercise juris-
diction consistent with the requirements of the Federal Constitution."' The
Supreme Court, while recognizing that the circumstances surrounding this
accident fell within the "twilight zone" 14 of uncertainty created by the Jensen
doctrine, declined to reexamine the constitutional implications of that doctrine.
It held that in the absence of findings by the federal agency establishing a pre-
sumption of federal jurisdiction,15 a presumption of constitutionality attached
to the state statute and that, therefore, the Constitution presented "no bar"
to the state agency's entertainment of the claim.
1 6
Chief Justice Stone, in a dissenting opinion,1 7 argued that the facts of this
accident fell within the area of federal jurisdiction as delimited by the present
Court in Parker v. Motor Boat Sales 18 where a claim for the death of a janitor
drowned while riding with a co-employee in the employer's motorboat was
allowed under the federal statute on the ground that the employee was engaged
in a "maritime" activity.19 The Chief Justice criticized also the system of "over-
lapping" presumptions created by the majority opinion as inconsistent with
the "exclusive" liability established by the overriding federal statute, 2 0 and
indicated that a desirable occasion had arisen for reconsideration of the Jensen
doctrine.
21
land. It is not always easy to determine, moreover, what constitutes land and what con-
stitutes water. See The Admiral People, 295 U. S. 649 (1935); Vancouver Steamship
Co. v. Rice, 288 U. S. 445 (1933) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm.,
276 U. S. 467 (1928).
11. 317 U. S. 249 (1942).
12. Compare The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213 (U. S. 1867).
13. 12 Wash. (2d) 349, 121 P. (2d) 365 (1942).
14. Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 256 (1942).
15. Id. at 256-57. Section 20 of the federal act, 44 STAT. 1436 (1927), 33 U. S. C.
§ 920 (1940), provides that in proceedings under that act, jurisdiction is to be "presumed,
in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary."
16. Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 257 (1942). Mr.
Justice Black considered the problem comparable to that of determining whether a par-
ticular state act unduly burdens interstate commerce. In these cases the Court has heavily
relied upon a presumption of constitutionality in favor of state legislation. See South
Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 188, 191 (1938); Railway
Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 (1931) ; Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett,
276 U. S. 245 (1928).
17. Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 260 (1942).
18. 314 U. S. 244 (1941).
19. Id. at 247.
20. Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 261 (1942).
21. Id. at 263-64.
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The majority, while ostensibly adhering to the doctrine, would seem to have
abandoned all attempt to give content to the Jensen line of demarcation. For,
as the opinion indicates, if the federal agency had first found "jurisdiction,"
the Court would have respected the presumption arising from that agency's
findings, and the injury could, then, equally well have been placed within that
realm of admiralty law where uniformity of remedy is essential. Nor may it be
argued that the demarcation has been retained because the Court has by a
system of presumptions shifted the responsibility of classifying facts in a par-
ticular case to the administrative agency presented with the initial determina-
tion of jurisdiction. While such a presumption may have been extended to
the findings of the federal agency in the Parker case,2 in the principal case
both the state compensation agency and the Washington Supreme Court had
held the statute constitutionally inapplicable.2 3 Not even the provisions of the
state statute, by virtue of the presumption of constitutional applicability, may
be considered determinative in respect to jurisdiction. For the Washington
statute was so limited by its express terms as to apply only "to those for whom
no right . . . [existed] under the maritime laws."
2 4
Apparently, therefore, the marginal employee has the option of a recovery
from either the state or federal agency irrespective of nice questions of juris-
diction 25 provided that he can prove a prima facie case under the requirements
of the governing statute.2 6 Thus he is relieved from the possible expense of
an unsuccessful suit before one agency, with the concurrent risk of the Statute
22. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244, 246 (1941) as interpreted by Mr. Jus-
tice Black in Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 257
(1942). See note 15 supra.
23. The Court seemingly ignores the following section of the state act: "In all
court proceedings under or pursuant to this act the decision of the department shall be
prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same."
WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7697. The state officer found: "that the
work which the claimant was doing at the time of the said fatal accident . . . (did] not
come under the jurisdiction of the workmen's compensation act, but . . . [was] maritime
in character" and "that the alleged injury was sustained on board a vessel in navigable
waters and was therefore under admiralty jurisdiction." Davis v. Dep't of Labor and
Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 263, n. 2 (1942).
24. "VASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7693a. Another provision of the
statute reads: "this act is intended to apply to all . . . inherently hazardous works and
occupations, and it is its purpose to embrace all of them which are within the legislative
jurisdiction of the state." Id. § 7674.
25. See note 4 spra.
26. Certainly, the federal agency could not make an overriding contrary finding of
fact when the claim is with the state agency. When the claim is with the federal agency,
its findings are considered conclusive. The worker's option, however, may be thwarted
by a finding against jurisdiction by the agency of his choice. In this connection, Chief
Justice Stone raises the following objection to the court's solution: "the . . . doctrine
does not reveal . . . what the function of this Court is to be in cases where the federal
and state commissioners both find against jurisdiction. " Davis V. Dep't of Labor
and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 262-63 (1942).
19441
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of Limitations barring a second suit before the other.2 7 But opponents of the
majority's solution 28 have argued that it only partially eliminates the prob-
lem arising from the "twilight zone" because the employer, who must qualify
prior to the injury, may now be held equally liable for contribution tinder the
state or federal statute 29 at the choice 3 0 of the claiming employee. While the
possibility of such alternating liability already existed as a result of incon-
sistent court decisions, 31 it is probable that the majority's decision will increase
this risk. For the employee's choice may be guided in the future not by pre-
xistent, if vague, legal rules concerning the classification of his employment,
but by economic considerations as to the maximum financial benefit obtainable
for his injury. Thus jurisdiction will vary with the inconsistently 8- varying
27. See the holding in Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 477 (D. Md. 1936), that a
failure to file a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act within one year after injury or death barred any remedy under that Act, notwith-
standing the fact that the employee had mistakenly proceeded under the state compen-
sation statute. Claimant's rights under the Act can be protected, however, by filing simul-
taneous claims within the one year period. See the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1432 (1927), 33 U. S. C. § 913, a-d (1940). The
Washington Act has also a one year filing limitation. WASH. Rz'. STAT. ANN. (Rei-
ington, 1932) § 7686. Most of the state acts contain six months to one year limitation
periods. See Note (1932) 78 A. L. R. 1294.
28. See Chief Justice Stone's dissent, Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of
Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 260-62 (1942) ; (1943) 41 MiC. L. REv. 1190, 1193; (1943) 10 U.
oF Cur. L. Rav. 339, 344.
29. The employer is also liable for substantial additional payments and subject to
fine and imprisonment under the provisions of the federal enactment if the federal agency
does not finally assume jurisdiction. 44 STAT. 1439, 1442 (1927), 33 U. S. C. §§ 938,
932 (1940).
30. See note 26 supra.
31. State industrial commissions have had similar difficulty in determining their proper
function in respect to maritime accidents. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. 577
(1933) 119. Insurance companies, too, have been concerned with the problem. See 23
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY (1937) 171, 187, 213-19, 228-36.
32. The federal act, for example, provides a maximum total compensation of $7500
for almost all types of injuries and disabilities. See 44 STAT. 1424, 1434 (1927), 33 U. S.
C. § 914(m) (1940). State provisions may authorize higher or lower maximum payments
or may set no maximum whatsoever. Even where the maximum payment authorized is
higher under the federal act, the maximum period of compensation or the amount payable
per week may be lower than under the provisions of a particular state act. Similar varia-
tions may exist with respect to maximum amounts payable for death, for permanent total or
permanent partial disabilities, and for temporary disabilities, or with respect to the length
of periods of payment for partial disabilities, such as loss of a thumb or an arm. See Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, Bull. 672 (1940) 202-14.
An indication of the factors which would be considered by the employee in choosing
one agency or the other is afforded by a comparison of the provisions of the Washing-
ton Workmen's Compensation Act, WASH. Ray. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§ 7673-
7796, with those of the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 44 STAT. 1424-
46 (1927), 33 U. S. C. §§ 900-50 (1940). Payments made under the federal act constitute
a percentage of the employee's wage. Under the Washington act, they constitute a lump
sum, bear no relation to wages, and only maximum payments are made.
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provisions of the state and federal acts as to maximum amounts allowable.
duration of payment, and rates per week or per injury. Although some
Death VASHixGTo\, AcT FzEn.m Acr
a) Maximum period of Widowhood or specified mi- Widowhood or specified mi-
compensation nority age of children. nority age of children.
b) Maximum payment $55 for widow and two chil- Approximately $100.
per month dren, plus $5 for each addi-
tional child under 16 years.




a) -Maximum period of Whole period of disability. Whliole period of disability.
compensation
b) Maximum payment $60 if wife and two children, Approximately $100. In ad-
per month plus $275 for each additional dition to compensation, em-
child, plus $25 for constant ployee undergoing vocational
attendant if necessary. rehabilitation is paid cost of
maintenance, maximum $10
weekly.




a) Maximum period of The Washington Act pro- The federal act varies the
compensation vides for a lump sum pay- periods of compensation with
b) 'Maximum payment ment, such as $3000 (ma.'d- the type of injury. Leg (at
per month mum, per injury) for loss of hip), 248 weeks. Loss of
one arm or leg so near the sight of an eye, 140weeks.
c) 'Maximum total pay- shoulder or hip that no arti- The payments v-ary from $8
ment ficial arm or hip can be to ',5 a week, and the total
worn, or $1080 for the loss maximum is $7500. Total
of sight of one eye. payment for leg, $1934-$6200.
In addition to compensation,
employee undergoing voca-
tional rehabilitation is paid
cost of maintenance, maxi-
mum $10 weekly.
Total payment (compensa-




a) Maximum period of Whole period of disability. \Whole period of disability.
compensation
b) Maximum payment $60 if wife and two children, Approximately $100. In ad-
per month plus $5 for each additional dition to compensation, em-
child, plus $25 for constant ployee undergoing vocational
attendant if necessary, rehabilitation is paid cost of
maintenance, maximum $10
weekly.
c) Maximum total pay- No maximum. $7500.
ment
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employers may protect themselves against double liability by insurance poli-
cies covering b9 th acts,
3 the use of insurance for such a purpose is circum-
scribed. The federal act permits private insurance ;34 but in six states com-
pulsory state compensation funds 35 eliminate the possibility of a double policy
entirely. The high cost of such policies, moreover, ranging up to 65 per cent
over usual compensation rates except with respect to certain classes of mar-
ginal employees subject to standard rates for double coverage, renders them
an unsatisfactory substitute for certain liability under one act.80
In view of this continuing problem, the Court's reluctance to overrule the
Jensen decision would seem to indicate the desirability of Congressional
action ;37 yet so long as the Jensen case stands as law, further legislation could
hardly be effective to solve the problem of the marginal employee unless Con-
gress were willing to supersede state law entirely and provide compensation
33. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from National Council on Compensation
Insurance, February 21, 1944.
34. 44 STAT. 1424, 1439 (1927), 33 U. S. C. § 932 (1940).
35. NEv. Coup. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 2680; N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (Supp.
1925) § 396.6; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) §§ 1465-69; WAsn. RaV. STAT. ANN.
(Remington, 1932) §§ 7673-7674; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943)
§§ 251f-2519; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 124.102-124.103. While the
Oregon act also provides for an exclusive fund, ORE. Co tp. LAWS ANN. (1940)
§ 102.1736, it provides that the fund may insure employers subject to the act against their
liability under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, id. § 49.1841.
The Nevada and West Virginia acts are "elective" in respect to private employments,
but the employer who fails to file with the act is deprived of his common law defenses
in a suit brought by the employee. It is not probable, therefore, that an insurance policy
covering this alternative liability could be obtained except at a very high rate. The Ohio
and West Virginia acts provide for self-insurance. This permits the employer able to
demonstrate financial responsibility to become directly liable to the employee, but pro-
visions authorizing self-insurance are available only to a limited number of employers.
36. Policies which cover marginal employees engaged in stevedoring, shipwright
work, ship scaling, talleying, etc., provide for coverage under both the Federal Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and the state compensation act.
Policies covering these classes of employees under only one act are, apparently, the ex-
ception and the rate for such so-called "partial coverage" is that proportion of the total
rate which the pure premium for the portion subject to coverage bears to the total pure
premium for the employment involved. No combined policies are generally available,
however, for marginal employees other than the classes mentioned. When double cover-
age is required for such employees, the rate is increased by a percentage which ranges
from zero to sixty-five per cent, depending on the comparative ratio between the benefits
under the state compensation act and the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from National Council on
Compensation Insurance, February 21, 1944.
37. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, Davis v. Dep't of Labor and
Industries, 317 U. S. 249, 258-59 (1942).
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for all injuries occurring on navigable waters.35 A broad Congressional defi-
nition of "maritime" employment would be no easier to apply to hard facts
than a court definition ;39 and a Congressional attempt to define precise situa-
tions falling within the federal statute might by an undesirable specificity pre-
vent application of the statute in cases where the state could still not consti-
tutionally exercise jurisdiction. Federal legislation attempting to incorporate
state law by reference so as to render it applicable to all employees not cov-
ered by the federal seaman's act 40 would, so long as the Jensen doctrine re-
mains law, fair for noncompliance with the requirements of uniformity.
41
On the other hand, re~xamination of the Jensen decision might be difficult
in the absence of some Congressional action because the federal statute has
been interpreted as incorporating the .ensen boundary of demarcatinm.4 -5 Thus,
in those cases where the application of state law is in issue, a constitutional
question might not arise because state law would always be validly limited by
the Jensen doctrine as the statutory criterion of the limits of the clearly supe-
rior federal act.4 3 Cases arising under the federal act would involve merely a
problem of statutory interpretation. 44 But, as Chief Justice Stone suggested
in his dissent,45 when an employer liable under the federal statute has failed
to file with the federal agency, the employee is permitted the alternative of
38. This type of statute would still not solve the problem of marginal employees
injured on land while working under a "maritime" contract. See note 10 sipra. There
is a slight possibility, also, that a federal statute including non-maritime employments
might be considered unconstitutional, since workmen's compensation is said to be con-
tractual in nature. See P. J. Carlin Construction Co. v. Heaney, 299 U. S. 41 (1936);
see also note 6 mpra.
39. See page 351 mtpra.
40. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1940).
41. A congressional proviso saving from the jurisdiction of admiralty courts the
"rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State," 40 SrTAT.
395 (1917). 28 U. S. C. §§41(3), 371(3) (1940), amending the savings clause of the
judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73, 76-77 (1789), was held unconstitutional in Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 164 (1920). While the decision rests in part
on the principle of the non-delegability of legislative power, the Knicherbocker case ex-
tends the uniformity doctrine of the Jensen case in such a way as to require not merely
the application of the same law by both state and federal tribunals, but also the applica-
tion of a geographically uniform law. See Morrison, supra note 10, at 477-79. A similar
statute attempting to maintain such uniformity where essential, by excepting from opera-
tion of the saving clause "the master or members of the crew of a vessel," was also de-
clared invalid under the Jensen doctrine. State of Washington v. Dawson & Co.,
264 U. S. 219 (1924). But suits for injuries incurred while working on navigable waters
may still be brought in state courts. Messel v. Foundation Co.. 274 U. S. 427 (1927).
42. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244, 249-50 (1941).
43. See Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 263 (1942).
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 260-63.
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an action either "at law or admiralty." 46 The "action at law or admiralty"
interpreted as the employee's remedy under state law 47 would permit a re-
consideration of the Jensen criterion as a problem of constitutional limita-
tion.
48
If the Jensen doctrine were reconsidered, a practicable solution to the prob-
lem of the marginal employee might be obtained without the necessity of fur-
ther Congressional action provided that the Supreme Court were also willing
to revise its interpretation of the federal statute. Since the federal law is
applicable "if recovery may not validly be provided by state law," the restric-
tive phrase might be interpreted to cover those employees which any par-
ticular state statute either expressly excluded or clearly failed to include.
While Congress when adopting the phrase was probably contemplating the
Jensen limitation, it indicated by so restricting the area of federal applica-
tion that its intent was not to supersede state law but only to fill those gaps
where state law could not be deemed to apply. 4 To confine the meaning of
"validly apply" to "validly as, defined by the Jensen case" would seem an
unwarranted restriction of Congressional intent if the Jensen case were al-
ready overruled.
If the suggested interpretation of the federal act were adopted, employers
as well as employees and courts could easily determine the agency authorized
to exercise jurisdiction over their interests by examining the provisions of
their respective state acts. It might be argued, however, that as a result state
legislatures or courts interpreting statutes like that of Washington 50 would
extend these statutes to include longshoremen,"' now adequately and long
protected under federal law. Since no constitutional or federal statutory bar-
rier would exist, such an extension is clearly conceivable. If the state statute
were modified, however, by express legislative action, little prejudice could
result to either employer or employee, since the source of liability and of recov-
ery would be clear to both. If the extension were made by court interpreta-
tion, there would still seem to be little uncertainty once the initial case had
been determined. Despite the difficulty inherent in any shift of administrative
jurisdiction, it would seem that those longshoremen and stevedores who are
46. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U. S. C. §905 (1940).
47. See Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries of Wash., 317 U. S. 249, 263 (1942).
48. For a similar reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to reconsider a con-
stitutional principle deemed to have been incorporated into a Congressional enactment, see
Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U. S. 371 (1943). But see Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, id.
at 404.
49. The federal act intended to give "to these hard working men, engaged in a
somewhat hazardous employment, the justice involved in the modern principle of com-
pensation." SEN. Rm,. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) 16. See also remarks of
Representatives O'Connell and LaGuardia, 68 CoNG. REC. 5412-14 (1927).
50. See page 353 supra.
51. See note 7 supra. It is possible also that the Davis doctrine might be applied in
such a way as to achieve this result.
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local residents and essentially non-migratory, might better be protected by
state law.
52
SCOPE OF A HABEAS CORPUS HEARING ON INTERSTATE
EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS*
THE notorious incidence of "lynch law" in certain Southern states 1 has
engendered a reluctance to turn over to those states fugitives who are likely
to be deprived of their constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. Prob-
able deprivation of such a right has occasionally resulted in a governor's re-
fusal to honor an extradition request.2 Although the question has rarely
arisen, it is generally assumed that it would be improper under the federal
extradition statute3 for a state court to accomplish a similar result through
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 4 The usual statement is that in a
52. It might be argued that overruling of the Jensen case would cause state law
to be applied to "seamen"' and that, as a result, the employer would again be subject to
a double liability because the Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1940),
gives seamen a right of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Elimination
of the Jensen doctrine would, however, remove only the barriers to application of state
law within the area of "admiralty jurisdiction." See note 6 supra. Where Congressional
legislation provides a remedy, it would still presumably preEmpt the field.
As to seamen's injuries incurred on land, see Morrison, supra note 10, at 487-91;
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 279 U. S. 109 (1929).
But cf. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 276 U. S. 467 (1928). In
Occidental Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 143 P. (2d) 58 (D. C. App.
Cal. 1943), the Davis doctrine of dual presumptions was held inapplicable to a seaman
entitled to recover under the Jones Act.
* Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. County Superintendent of Prisons, Phila., 152 Pa.
Super. 167, 31 A. (2d) 576 (1943).
1. See SEN. REP. No. 1380, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1942); Amts, Tim CHA AGIN
CHARAcTER OF LYNCHING (1942); CHADBouRN, LYNCHIG Z AND THE LAv (1933).
2. If a governor refuses to extradite a criminal, no court has the power under fed-
eral law to compel him to do so, even though the Supreme Court has ruled it is a min-
isterial, not a discretionary, gubernatorial function. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 65
(U. S. 1861). The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act makes it mandatory, under state
law, for a governor to extradite a fugitive if on investigation the governor finds that the
fugitive is properly charged with a crime under the laws of the demanding state and was
present in the demanding state at the time the alleged crime was committed. Uxmroa.
CRrINAL EXTRADiTioN Act §§ 2, 3, 4.
3. Rsx. STAT. § 5278 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 662 (1934), enacted pursuant to U. S.
CoNsT. ART. IV, § 2. Federal authority is paramount. See Compton v. Alabama, 214
U. S. 1, 6 (1908); Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 439 (1914); Ex parte McKean, 3
Hughes 23, 16 Fed. Cas. 186, 187 (D. C. E. D. Va., 1878) ; Commonw.ealth v. Hare, 36
Pa. Super. 125, 129 (1908).
4. See Ex parte Paramore, 95 N. J. Eq. 386, 123 Ad. 246 (1924), aff'd, 96 N. J.
Eq. 397, 125 At. 926 (1924).
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habeas corpus proceeding the court may consider only whether the accused
is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the demanding state,5
whether he was there at the time the crime was committed,0 whether he is a
fugitive from justice, 7 and whether he is actually the individual wanted. 8 In
a recent case, however, a Pennsylvania court held that in a habeas corpus
proceeding 9 it was privileged to inquire into the treatment likely to be ac-
corded the fugitive in the demanding state and to release a prisoner held for
extradition to Georgia on the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment im-
lied a constitutional right not to be lynched.' 0
In Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. County Superintendent of Prisons,
Philadelphia," the prisoner, a negro boy held for extradition to Georgia on
warrant of the Governor of Pennsylvania,'1 2 presented strong evidence, in-
advertently corroborated by the Georgia authorities, to show that if extradited
he would be in grave danger of being lynched or otherwise denied a fair
trial.' 3 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania dismissed an appeal from an
5. See Commonwealth v. Hare, 36 Pa. Super. 125, 130 (1908) ; (1941) 8 U. oF Cn.
L. REV. 342.
6. See South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, 420 (1933).
7. See Ex parte Paramore, 95 N. J. Eq. 386, 123 Atl. 246 (1924), a/td, 96 N. J.
Eq. 397, 125 At. 926 (1924). The Court may not investigate the prisoner's guilt or inno-
cence. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432 (1914). Where an accused can prove undisputedly
that he is innocent, however, a few courts have released him on the ground that he is
not a fugitive from justice. See In re Kuhns, 36 Nev. 487, 137 Pac. 83 (1913) ; Ex parte
LaVere, 39 Nev. 214, 156 Pac. 446 (1916) ; People ex rel. Plumley v. Higgins, 109 Misc.
328, 178 N. Y. Supp. 728 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Ex parte Owens, 34 Olda. Crim. 128, 245 Pac.
68 (1926). A court may not question the motives of the executive of the demanding state.
Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906).
8. See People ex rel. Higley v. Millspaw, 281 N. Y. 441, 445, 24 N. E. (2d) 117,
120 (1939) ; People ex rel. Whitfield v. Enright, 117 Misc. 448, 451, 191 N. Y. Supp. 491,
493 (Sup. Ct. 1921). The governor or court may also consider whether extradition papers
are in good order. In re Waterman, 29 Nev. 288, 89 Pac. 291 (1907).
9. In Pennsylvania, which has enacted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, a
fugitive may demand a writ of habeas corpus as a matter of right. 19 PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1941) § 191.10.
10. Commonwealth ex reL. Mattox v. County Superintendent of Prisons, Phila., 152
Pa. Super. 167, 31 A. (2d) 576 (1943), 17 TEMP. L. Q. 469.
11. Ibid.
12. The negro boy, Mattox, was charged with criminal assault upon a white man
after a fight in which, the court states, the first move towards physical violence was made
by the latter. The latter had also slapped Mattox's two sisters, who were with Mattox
at the time, and hit Mattox with a car jack before the relator drew a knife and inflicted
superficial wounds on the white man. No attempt was made to prosecute the latter. Id.
at 178, 31 A. (2d) at 581.
13. Mattox's two sisters were held in jail for three months. Their mother, who sought
to have them released, was severely beaten, and no attempt was made to arrest her as-
sailants. Mattox's brother, who was not involved in this incident, was jailed and threat-
ened with mob violence by the sheriff unless they found Mattox in order to "kill him."
The Georgia county prosecutor objected to the Pennsylvania judge's sitting on the case
NOTES
order releasing the prisoner on bail.' 4 In reaching this result the Court relied
on dicta in one Pennsylvania case 15 and one United States Supreme Court
case,16 both implying that under the circumstances of the Mattox case a court
would be justified in protecting the fugitive's right under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'- The court's inability to offer more than iso-
lated dicta in support of its decision reflects the United States Supreme Court's
traditionally strict interpretation of the federal extradition statute I in the
interest of interstate harmony '9 and its tendency to limit habeas corpus pro-
ceedings to consideration of jurisdictional issues.2 0
on the ground that he had once sponsored anti-lynching legislation in Congress. Id. at
179, 31 A. (2d) at 581.
14. Commonwealth cx rel. Alattox v. County Superintendent o.f Pri.tins Phila.. 152
Pa. Super. 167, 31 A. (2d) 576 (1943).
15. Commonwealth cx ref. Flower v. Superintendent of Philadelphia County Prison,
220 Pa. 401, 411, 69 Atl. 916, 919 (1908), aff'g 33 Pa. Super. 594 (1907).
16. Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S. 63 (1909). "It is clear that the executive authority
of a state in which an alleged fugitive may be found, and for whose arrest a demand is
made in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States, need not he con-
trolled in the discharge of his duty by considerations of race or color, nor by the mere
suggestion-certainly not one inmspported by proof, as was the case here-that the alked
fugitive will not be fairy and justly dealt with in the state to which it is son qht to remove
his nor be adequately protected, while in the custody of such state, against the action of
lawless and bad men." Id. at 69. The Pennsylvania court stated that the excerpt italicized
by it implied "that if the charge . . . had been established to the satisfaction of the judge
who granted the writ of habeas corpus . . .it would have been a sufficient ground for
releasing the relator from custody and refusing to deliver him up to the representatives
of the demanding state." 152 Pa. Super. 167, 174, 31 A. (2d) 576, 579 (1943).
17. Courts previously have ruled that danger of being lynched is not sufficient reasun
for not extraditing the fugitive. See Ex parte Ray, 215 Mich. 156, 183 N. W. 774 (1921) ;
Ople v. Weinbrenner, 2,85 Mo. 365, 226 S. V. 256 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 695
(1921); Ex parte Paramore, 95 N. J. Eq. 386, 123 Ati. 246 (1924), aff'd, 96 N. J. Eq.
397, 125 Ati. 926 (1924). These cases may be distinguished from the Mattox case on the
ground that in all of them the court expressed doubt as to whether there was actually any
danger of the prisoner's being lynched. But see People ex rel. ,Vhitfield v. Enright, 117
Misc. 448, 191 N. Y. Supp. 49f (Sup. Ct. 1921). Compare Pahli v. Pollack, 174 Misc.
981, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 413 (Sup. Ct. 1940), with State ex rel. Cooney v. Hoffmeister,
336 Mo. 682, 80 S. IV. (2d) 195 (1935). The operation of the Statute of Limitations in
the demanding state is not to be considered in extradition proceedings. Waggoner v.
Feeney, 44 N. E. (2d) 499 (Ind. 1942). See generally (1941) 54 HAv. L Ray. 503.
18. RI. STAT. § 5278 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 662 (1934).
19. Justice Holmes considered interstate harmony so important that he stated: "In
extradition proceedings, even when as here a humane opportunity is afforded to test
them upon habeas corpus, the purpose of the writ is not to substitute the judgment of
another tribunal upon the facts or the law of the matter to be tried. The Constitution
• . . peremptorily requires that upon proper demand the person charged shall be deliv-
ered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." Drew v. Thaw,
235 U. S. 432, 439 (1914). The Supreme Court has said that this harmony would be
jeopardized by refusal of the asylum state to extradite a fugitive. See Kentucky v. Den-
nison, 24 How. 66, 100 (U. S. 1860).
20. See Valentina v. Mercer, 201 U. S. 131 (1906).
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In Johnson v. Zerbst,21 however, the Supreme Court stated that sufficient
denial of due process raises a jurisdictional issue. The Zerbst case held that
appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant was a jurisdictional requisite
in a federal criminal trial.22 The Court has also approved the use of writs of
habeas corpus by federal courts to facilitate an appeal in a criminal case 28
and to set aside state court convictions based on trials which were flagrantly
unfair and unconstitutional 24 or on con fessions extorted by third degree meth-
ods.2 5 These cases suggest a characterization of habeas corpus jurisdiction
which would seem to support the Mattoxr decision.
20
The analogy of the Mattox decision to the Zerbst line of authority is, how-
ever, defective in at least one respect; in the former, habeas corpus was issued
to prevent infringement of the fugitive's constitutional rights, whereas in the
latter, habeas corpus was used to rectify infringements which had already oc-
curred. For this reason the cases in which federal courts have enjoined state
criminal trials 27 would seem to be more nearly comparable to the Matlox
situation. In both the federal injunction cases and the Matto.r case the right
of each state to try its own criminals according to its laws,28 plus the desir-
ability of promoting harmony between sovereign jurisdictions by according
them that right,29 was opposed by the right of every individual to due process
of law.30 The federal courts have reconciled this conflict by saying that a
state criminal trial will be enjoined only when the individual's constitutional
21. 304 U. S. 458 (1938). But cf. Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148 (1898) ; Pet-
tibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 201 (1906).
22. The federal courts probably have been granted the power to consider constitu-
tional issues in a habeas corpus proceeding, but, apparently, never refer to this power.
preferring the grounds of the Zerbst case. REv. STAT. §753 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 453
(1924) ; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 201 (1906); see (1939) 24 CORN. L. Q. 270.
23. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann. 317 U. S. 269 (1942).
24. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 222 (1941) ; Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S.
329 (1940) ; cf. Carey v. Brady, 125 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) ; Wilson v. Lanagan,
99 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938).
25. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
26. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 248 (1886).
27. See cases cited infra note 31. These cases generally involve a challenge of state
statutes prohibiting the exercise of a civil liberty or of certain business activities on pain
of criminal penalties, by suits to enjoin enforcement brought either before or after the
forbidden act is committed. The advantage of the injunctive suit and, similarly, of the
declaratory judgment action is the fact that the constitutional issue may be raised without
the petitioner's subjecting himself to possible criminal penalties. See Borehard, Challnc,-
ing "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action (1943) 52 YALe. L. J. 445.
28. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 161 (1943) ; Harkrader v. Wad-
ley, 172 U. S. 148, 162 (1898).
29. See Di Giovanni v. Canada Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64, 73 (1935).




rights are in great and immediate danger of being irreparably impaired.3 '
In the Matto- case the relator clearly showed that he was in great and im-
mediate danger of being irreparably lynched, and the Pennsylvania court
would seem, therefore, to have come within the rule of the federal injunction
cases, assuming that Mattox had a constitutional right not to be lynched cap-
able of being infringed.
It is far from settled, however, that such a constitutional right exists. =
Those who deny it rely on the early Supreme Court cases of United States
v. Harris - and Powell v. United States.a4 In each instance a prisoner of
the state was lynched before trial. The mob leaders were indicted under
section 19 of the United States Criminal Code, which makes it a federal of-
fense to conspire ". . to injure. . . any citizen in the . . . enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution. . . of the United
States . .. " 35 Demurrers were upheld on the ground that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not give Congress the power to legislate with reference to
private individuals. From this the inference is drawn that there is no consti-
tutional right not to be lynched which is judicially enforceable. It is unlikely,
however, that either case would be so interpreted by the present Supreme
Court, which has tended to expand rather than contract the personal guarantees
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30
The view that there is a constitutional right not to be lynched was adopted
in the circuit court case of Ex parte Riqgins.3 T in which under the identical
fact situation of United States v. Harris and Powell v. United States the lynch-
ers were convicted under section 19 of the Criminal Code. The court distin-
guished the Harris decision 3 s and based its opinion squarely on the due pro-
cess clause. It held, in effect, that accused persons have a constitutional right
31. Compare Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 163 (1943) ; Vatson v.
Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 400 (1941) ; Beal v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 312 U. S. 45, 49 (1940) ;
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 95 (1935); 'Matthews v. Rodgers,
284 US. 521, 526 (1932), with Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 428 (1927) ; Packard
v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 216 (1923);
Walnut Transfer and Storage Co. v. Harrison, 185 Ga. 720, 723, 196 S. E. 432, 434
(1938). See KIMG, INJUcroINs To PaorEcr CIVIL LmnErxis (1928). See also (1941)
27 VA. L. REv. 709; (1941) 10 Gzo. WASr. L. Ruv. 233. But a state criminal trial never
can be enjoined once it has begun. See Clive v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445, 452
(1927).
32. See Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right "Arot to be Lynchcd" (1943) 28 ,VAsiI.
U. L. Q. 57.
33. 106 U. S. 629 (1882).
34. 212 U. S. 564 (1909).
35. REv. STAT. §5508 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §51 (1927).
36. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) ; see also Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S.
547 (1942); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
37. 134 Fed. 404 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1904), rev'd on other grounds, 199 U. S. 547
(1905).
38. Id. at 415.
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not to be lynched on the ground that such violence deprives them of their
right to a fair trial. This theory was affirmed by a recent case in which a
deputy sheriff was convicted partly for failure to protect his charges against
mob violence.39 Another line of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade
has also stressed that a prisoner's right to a fair trial includes court protection
against pre-trial violence. The Supreme Court has reversed convictions where
defendants have been tortured before trial 4 and where confessions have been
extracted by mob threats. 41 Therefore, it would seem that those in custody
of the law have a constitutional right to be protected against lynching, whether
perpetrated by state officials 42 or by private individuals.
In the absence of threatened violence, however, the fact that the prisoner,
if extradited and if not lynched, would probably not be given a fair trial is
by itself a questionable ground on which to grant a preventive remedy, such
as habeas corpus, since inequities in court procedure can always be challenged
on appeal. This is the usual attitude of federal equity courts when asked to
enjoin a state criminal trial. The Supreme Court has stated that the constitu-
tionality of a state statute cannot be challenged by collateral injunction pro-
ceedings when the appellant pleads only that raising the constitutional issue
on appeal from a conviction would subject him to the risk of a prison term
were the statute upheld. 43 Presumably, therefore, a court cannot release a
prisoner in a habeas corpus proceeding on the ground that he will undoubtedly
be denied a fair trial. Such a preventive remedy should be granted only
where a prisoner is confronted with probable and drastic personal violence.
ADMISSIBILITY IN A FEDERAL COURT OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED UNDER A STATE IMMUNITY STATUTE*
LEGAL forms embodying the conception that a man should not be forced
to testify against himself have varied with the requirements of particular
39. Catlette v. United States, 132 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943). The police officer
removed his badge and helped manhandle some Jehovah's Witnesses. The court ruled
that removal of his badge did not exempt him from the responsibilities of his office, and
he was convicted for joining in the assault and also failing to protect the Witnesses against
mob violence.
40. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86
(1923).
41. Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547 (1942).
42. Section 19 of the Criminal Code can undoubtedly be used to protect an individual's
constitutional rights against encroachment by state officials. United States v. Classic,
313 U. S. 299 (1941) ; see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1875).
43. Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1935).
* United States v. Feldman, 136 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
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places and periods.' Yet the conception itself remained unimpaired until the
introduction into a federal system of government of federal and state statutes
compelling testimony.2 Purportedly, these statutes harmonize the function of
the privilege against self-incrimination contained in federal and state consti-
tutions with the object of obtaining information 3 by substituting immunity
from prosecution because of crimes divulged for the protection previously
afforded a witness by his silence.4 Since the legislative immunity controls,
however, only the jurisdiction within which testimony is compelled, the possi-
bility remains that evidence so obtained may be used prejudicially against
the witness in another jurisdiction to which the power to immunize does not
1. The privilege against self-incrimination arose at common law as a series of evi-
dentiary rules preventing the extraction of forced testimony. The privilege included not
only the right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution to refuse to give testimony, but
also that of a witness in a civil prosecution to refuse to respond to questions the answers
to which he claimed might incriminate him. For discussions of the historical genesis of
the privilege, see 9 HOLDsWOIrH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH Lw (1938) 193-202; 8 IWVIG1oGE.
EVrDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2250; Pittman, The Colonial and Conslitulional Histor, of the
Privilege Against Self Incrimination in America (1935) 21 VA. L. RE . 763.
The privilege was later embodied in the Federal Constitution, U. S. Cot'sT. A.'I=Du.
V., and in all but two state constitutions. The provisions of the state constitutions are
assembled in 8 ,ViGmoRE, EvrIENcE § 2282, n. 3. The wording of the Federal Constitu-
tion is typical: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . ." U. S. CoxsT. A.,mND. V. Variations in constitutional phrasing
have not affected the scope of the privilege. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2252. In the
two states where the privilege has not found constitutional sanction, Iowva and New Jersey,
it has been held part of their common law. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. AV. 935
(1902) ; State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (1903).
2. A complete compilation of the "immunity" statutes may be found in 8 Wxcnom.
EviDENcE 472-501.
3. The plight of the regulatory agency in its attempt to secure information has been
persuasively presented in Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agences to Comnpel
Testinwny (1926) 39 H.kRv. L. REV. 694. See also 8 WIMsonu, EvImxEN- § 2251; Cor-
win, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incritinatlion Clause (1930) 29 Micu.
L. REv. 1; Rapacz, Rules Governzing the Allowance of the Prvlege Against Self-Incrin-
ination (1935) 19 'I.%N. L. REv. 426; Wartels and Pollit, A Critical Comment on the
Privilege Against SeIf-Crindnation (1929) 18 Ky. L. J. 18; Comment (1940) 49 YML
L. J. 1059.
4. See the statement in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 555 (1S92):
". . no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he an-
swers the criminating question put to him can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Constitution of the United States."
Nevertheless, it is now the rule apparently that "full and complete immunity against
prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the pro-
tection furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination." United States v.
Mfurdock, 284 U. S. 141, 149 (1931). See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1905) ; Jack v.
Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905) ; Brown v. WNVaker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896) ; see also (1932)
41 Y.A L. J. 618. But ef. Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 1,6 (1906); United States ex
rel. Vajtauer v. Comm. of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 113 (1927) ; United States v. Sa-
line Bank, 1 Pet. 100 (U. S. 1828).
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extend. Judicial distinctions which hold this limited immunity the legal
equivalent of the privilege destroyed 5, should not be permitted to obscure
the fact that silence wherever maintained would protect a witness against
prosecutions in either state or federal jurisdictions. Realization of this fact
might well influence a determination of the question whether testimony com-
pelled by a promise of legislative immunity is, or should be, admissible evi-
dence against the testifiant in a jurisdiction not subject to the legislative fiat.
It would seem unfortunate, therefore, that the majority of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Feldman " should have
rested their affirmation of the competency of such evidence solely on legal
analogy. The testimony introduced in this case, a federal prosecution for
fraudulent use of the mails, had been obtained from the defendant by virtue
of a state immunity statute 7 in proceedings conducted by New York judg-
ment creditors. Although the defendant argued that the introduction of prior
testimony which he had been powerless to withhold would have the practical
effect of violating his Federal Constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation,8 the district court overruled the objection. The Circuit Court, in sus-
taining the ruling, relied in the admitted absence of authority on the point,0
on inferences to be drawn from the holding of United States v. Murdock 10
and the enactment of a federal statute, subsequently repealed, which would
have barred the evidence.
1 '
5. These decisions are based on the conception that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is operative with respect only to the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is asserted.
See Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896) : a witness compelled to testify tinder a fed-
eral statute cannot assert in a federal proceeding a privilege against self-incrimination
under state law. See also United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931). Similarly, a
witness compelled to testify in a state proceeding, cannot assert his privilege against self-
incrimination under federal law. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905).
6. 136 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). But see Judge Clark's dissent, d. at 399.
7. The defendant's testimony was given in special proceedings brought by judgment
creditors in New York state. The New York statute under which the evidence was com-
pelled provides: "A debtor, party or witness examined in a special proceeding, authorized
by this article, is not excused from answering a question on the ground that his examina-
tion will tend to convict him of the commission of a fraud . . . but no person shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise, and no testimony so given or produced shall be received against him upon
any criminal investigation or proceeding, except on a charge or indictment for perjury
committed in an examination under this article." N. Y. Civ. PRACTICE ACT § 789.
8. United States v. Feldman, 136 F. (2d) 394, 397 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
9. One decision had held that incriminating testimony obtained in a state prosect-
tion might be used against a defendant on cross-examination, but in this case the defend-
ant had waived his constitutional privilege by taking the stand to testify. Vause v. United
States, 53 F. (2d) 346, 356 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
10. 284 U. S. 141 (1931).
11. Rmv. STAT. § 860 (1878) reads: "No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or
evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or
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Since the Congressional statute had prohibited the introduction into United
States courts of testimony obtained from a party or witness in any prior
judicial proceeding, its enactment would not necessarily imply Congressional
belief that the federal privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the
Fifth Amendment would not prevent the use of testimony extracted by a
state immunity statute.'2 And in any event, Congressional belief as to the
scope of Constitutional provisions would seem hardly persuasive authority.
Nor would the holding in United States v. Murdock 13 seem to offer more
convincing criteria of determination. Here it was held that a witness could
not claim his federal privilege against self-incrimination as a protection against
possible incriminatibn under state law. The issue whether a claim of
privilege should be allowed would seem hardly comparable to the question
whether the Constitutional privilege to which a defendant in a criminal prose-
cution is undoubtedly entitled includes also a protection against the use of
incriminating testimony forced from him by state compulsion.
The Murdock decision does apparently hold, however, that the federal
privilege against self-incrimination may be claimed for the purpose of pro-
tection against federal prosecution alone. The circuit court seemed to infer
from this that a state privilege is similarly restricted in scope and that, there-
fore, the privilege against self-incrimination urged in the New York judgment
creditor proceedings was not violated by use of the defendant's testimony in
a subsequent federal prosecution. Considerations as to the state privilege,
however, would seem to have been irrelevant except insofar as ideas of comity
might have influenced a federal court to respect the protection held out
by a state immunity statute.14 The circuit court's argument obscures entirely
the question whether the defendant's Federal Constitutional privilege was
violated. It may be, however, that the circuit court inferred from the rule
in the Murdock case that incriminating evidence obtained under a federal
immunity statute would be admissible in a subsequent state proceeding and
that, therefore, testimony compelled in a state proceeding should be likewise
any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him or
his property or estate, in any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or
for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture: Prozided. That this section shall not
exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in
discovering or testifying as aforesaid."
12. United States v. Feldman, 136 F. (2d) 394, 398 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
13. 284 U. S. 141 (1931).
14. The circuit court also argued that the defendant had been given an immunity
equivalent to that afforded by the New York immunity statute because the testimony was
not used as evidence of the crime for which the defendant %was indicted, but as evidence
only of prior crimes on which the Statute of Limitations had run. United States v. Feld-
man, 136 F. (2d) 394, 398-99 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). The New York statute, however,
protected the witness not only against prosecution for crimes his testimony revealed but
provided also that no "testimony so given . . . [should] be used against him upon any
criminal investigation or proceeding." N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr § 789.
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admissible in a subsequent federal prosecution. Even if an immunity statute
had been a factor in the Murdock situation, however, it would not necessarily
have followed that the evidence there obtained would be admissible in a sub-
sequent state proceeding, since its admissibility would depend entirely on
local rules of evidence. In at least one state case in which the question has
arisen it has been held that to admit testimony compelled by a federal im-
munity statute would violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation guaranteed to him by the state constitution. 10  Similarly, the question
of admissibility in federal courts depends only on federal rules of evidence.
While the rule in United States v. Murdock does indicate a tendency to
restrict the Constitutional privilege against self-incriminaton, it is questionable
whether the restrictionary policy expressed would or should extend to the
situation in the Feldman case. The Supreme Court may have felt that a wit-
ness' claim of the privilege to withhold testimony only possibly useable in
another jurisdiction was overbalanced by the need for obtaining information
which the witness alone was empowered to give. Yet the same Court might
equally well have hesitated before reducing the Constitutional privilege of a de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution to a procedural requirement preventing him
from being called as a witness,16 but not prohibiting the use of his own forced
testimony to secure his conviction. The Court may also have felt in the
Murdock case that danger of prosecution under state law was "remote," since
the factor of remoteness was emphasized in decisions on which this ruling
was based.17 Such a belief would give little indication as to the Supreme
15. Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 So. 135 (1914).
16. See 20 STAT. 30 (1878), 28 U. S. C. 632 (1940) making a defendant charged with
a federal crime a competent witness "at his own request but not otherwise." (italics
added).
17. American cases on which the Murdock ruling was based seem to create a coll-
clusive presumption that the danger of prosecution by another jurisdiction is improbable.
In Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905), a state court denying a claim of the privilege
based on possible federal prosecution relied on the fact that it did not believe there was
"any real danger of a Federal prosecution or that such evidence would be availed of by
the government for such a nrposc." (italics added). See also Brown v. Walker, 161
U. S. 591 (1896), where the Court considered the danger of possible prosecution in an-
other jurisdiction an improbable one, which it was not the purpose of the Constitutional
provision to obviate. The rule of the English case cited in the Murdock opinion seems
to be that the privilege will be denied when only a claim of possible prosecution is made;
The King of Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 1 Sim. (N.s.) 301, 61 Eng. Rep. R. 116 (1851);
Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. R. 730 (1861) ; cf. In re Atherton, [1912]
2 K. B. 251; but that it may be allowed when the foreign law under which the party may
be held liable is set out in the pleadings. See United States v. McRae, L. R. 4 Eq. 327,
336, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 79, 85 (1867) where the court said that the judge in the Two
Sicilies Case "could not have contemplated a case where the presumed ignorance of the
Judge as to foreign law is completely removed by the admitted statements upon the
pleadings, in which the exact nature of the penalty or forfeiture incurred by the party
objecting to answer is precisely stated. .... "
Practical considerations might have precluded application of the English rule in the
Murdock case. It would be difficult to determine the degree of probable danger necessary
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Court's attitude toward a situation in which the "remote" danger had become
actualized.
Other than Constitutional prohibitions, however, might preclude the use of
testimony like that offered in the Feldnwn case. For in McNabb v. Unitcd
States,'8 the present Supreme Court recently adopted as a criterion of admis-
sibility in federal courts the vague notion of compliance with "civilized
standards of procedure and evidence" and emphasized that these "are not
satisfied merely by observance of . . .minimal historic safeguards." "Civil-
ized standards of procedure and evidence" might forbid the use of testimony
against a defendant who despite a right to two distinct Constitutional privi-
leges against self-incrimination was in fact being forced to testify against
himself. It would seem, moreover, that immunity granted in one jurisdiction
as a result of the limitation of the privilege of self-incrimination should be
respected in another. Otherwise, the objective of immunity statutes might be
impaired because to many witnesses the penalty for refusing to testify wuuld
be preferable to a subsequent criminal prosecution. Admission of such in-
criminating evidence might, also, facilitate collaborative action by federal and
state prosecutors, whereby proceedings to uncover testimony would be com-
menced in one jurisdiction in order to effect indictment under the laws of
the other.
to render the privilege allowable. See 8 WIG IoRE, EvIDENcE, § 2258. Such a rule would
also require in each case a consideration of the rules of law and pdicies of foreign juris-
dictions, with consequent administrative burden. See 8 WIaioRE, EvinF_=., 338-39.
Professor Vigmore's objection to the English rule, however, would not be as valid when
the danger is possible prosecution in another state of the United States or by the federal
government in the same state instead of by a foreign nation. There would not be much
difficulty in ascertaining the law since state statutes authorize state courts to take judicial
notice of the laws of sister states and of federal laws and, conversely, federal courts take
judicial notice of the laws of all the states. See Hanley . Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1 (1835) ;
Darling v. Dent, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. IV. 747 (1907) ; Baltimore & 0. S. WV. R. R. Y. Ber-
don, 195 Ind. 265, 150 N. E. 407 (1924) ; The danger of prosecution by another sover-
eignty is much more substantial in a federal system where both the state and federal gov-
ernments exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory. See McGovney, Self-
Criminating and Self-Disgracing Testimony Code Revision Bill (1920) 5 Iow L BUL.
174, 182-84.
18. 318 U. S. 332, 340 (1943).
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